The Official Teacher’s Companion Guide for Oliver Stone’s Untold History of the United States
designed by
The Untold History Education Project
Eric S. Singer M.Ed., Ph.D.
Defining “The Enemy”: American Wartime Propaganda and Politics

This lesson plan is designed to address, in part or in full, the following California History-Social Science Content Standard(s):

11.7 Students analyze America’s participation in World War II.

5. Discuss the constitutional issues and impact of events on the U.S. home front, including the internment of Japanese Americas (e.g., Fred Korematsu v. United States of America) and the restrictions on German and Italian resident aliens; the response of the administration to Hitler’s atrocities against Jews and other groups; the roles of women in military production; and the roles and growing political demands of African Americans.

Class Time: 65 minutes  (This lesson is designed to immediately follow the screening of episode 3 of Oliver Stone’s Untold History of the United States. The episode is 58 minutes in length. Assuming 45 minute class periods, teachers should, for example, plan to air the episode on Monday, complete it during the first twenty minutes of Tuesday’s class, begin this lesson on Tuesday after the screening and complete it on Wednesday.)

Objectives:

Students will be able to analyze and interpret American wartime propaganda imagery.

Students will be able to identify ways that many Americans defined the Japanese in time of war.

Students will be able to interpret the Supreme Court case Korematsu v. United States and craft their own concurrence or dissent.

Materials:

Supplement 3-A: PDF of American wartime propaganda imagery

Supplement 3-B: Primary sources pertaining to Japanese-American internment:

   Text of Executive Order 9066

   Text of Executive Order 9102:
“Instructions to All Persons of Japanese Ancestry”

Supplement 3-C: Analysis question handout for primary sources pertaining to Executive Orders 9066 and 9102.


Potential Interdisciplinary Connection:

This lesson is taught in History class while the book “Farewell to Manzanar” by Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston and James D. Houston is taught in English class.

Focusing Questions:

How did the U.S. government, American media and other Americans depict and treat Japanese and Japanese-Americans during World War II?

Was the relocation and internment of Japanese-Americans constitutional?

What must it have been like for Japanese-Americans to be relocated to internment camps against their will?

The Action:

*Lights are turned off when students enter the classroom. Teacher projects Supplement A on screen, then reads the quotes aloud from page one. Students are asked to record initial reactions to the quotes (3 minutes). Next, teacher shows three World War Two propaganda images from pages 2,3 and 4 of Supplement A, projecting each image for two minutes. Teacher asks students to record reactions, then remains silent while students reflect. (each image is shown for two minutes, six minutes total)*

*Lights are turned on, the teacher raises questions. Teacher asks, “What specific messages do you believe the artist was trying to convey in image one?” Teacher records three student responses on the white board for each image. Teacher then asks the same question pertaining to the other two images and records three student responses to each on the white board. (1 minute per student response, nine minutes total)*

*Teacher asks in the following order, “What do these images say about the American rationale for war? American perspectives toward the Japanese people? This will spur a ten-minute discussion. (The last question will serve as a transition into a discussion of Japanese and Japanese-American, German and Italian internment.) (10 minutes total)*
Teacher asks students to locate their copies of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Orders 9066 and 9102. Students have outlined these documents and answered questions on Supplement C for homework the night prior. Teacher provides background on Japanese internment by referencing the following sources:

http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation/


(10 minutes total)

After discussion, teacher asks, “Do you believe there is any connection between American attitudes towards the Japanese and the U.S. internment policy?” Students have five minutes to answer.

Teacher asks students to reference last question on the homework Supplement C. Teacher asks, “Do you believe the military should be given the power to relocate people of specific ethnicity for the purposes of national security? Why or why not?” Discussion ensues for ten minutes.

Teacher explains that Fred Korematsu, a Japanese-American who violated a U.S. government directive for him to leave his home for an internment camp, challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order 9066 in front of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1944. The 6-3 decision, which became known as Korematsu v. United States, found the order constitutional, and that national security concerns and the threat of sabotage and espionage trumped Korematsu’s rights as an American citizen.

Culminating Task (to be completed at home):

Read the Supreme Court’s opinion and three dissents on Korematsu v. United States at the following website:


After reading the entire opinion and three dissents, and after taking into account class discussions about Japanese and Japanese-American internment, pretend that you were a Supreme Court justice whose task it was to decide on Korematsu’s case. In 350 words, write your own concurrence or dissent. Your concurrence or dissent must address the following questions:

1) Why do you concur or dissent?
2) What constitutional basis supports your decision?
3) Include details and examples to support your answer.
Two-time Pulitzer Prize winning historian Allan Nevins observed after World War II: “Probably in all our history, no foe has been so detested as were the Japanese.”

Admiral William “Bull” Halsey characterized the Japanese as “yellow bastards.” According to historian John Dower, “Halsey described the Japanese as ‘stupid animals’ and referred to them as ‘monkeymen.’ During the war he spoke of the ‘yellow monkeys,’ and in one outburst declared that he was ‘rarin’ to go’ on a new naval operation ‘to get some more Monkey meat.’ He also told a news conference early in 1945 that he believed the ‘Chinese proverb’ about the origin of the Japanese race, according to which ‘the Japanese were a product of mating between female apes and the worst Chinese criminals who had been banished from China by a benevolent emperor.”

Time magazine article titled an article on the Battle of Iwo Jima “Rodent Exterminators” and asserted: “The ordinary unreasoning Jap is ignorant. Perhaps he is human. Nothing… indicates it.”

After being transferred from Europe to the Pacific, the popular war correspondent Ernie Pyle reflected: “In Europe we felt that our enemies, horrible and deadly as they were, were still people. But out here I soon gathered that the Japanese were looked upon as something subhuman and repulsive; the way some people feel about cockroaches or mice.”

In a letter to his future wife Bess in 1911, Harry Truman reflected: “I think one man is as good as another so long as he’s honest and decent and not a nigger or a Chinaman. Uncle Will says that the Lord made a white man from dust, a nigger from mud, then He threw up what was left and it came down a Chinaman. (Uncle Will) does hate Chinese and Japs. So do I. It is race prejudice, I guess. But I am strongly of the opinion Negroes ought to be in Africa, yellow men in Asia and white men in Europe and America.”
14. The Western perception of the Japanese as "little men" or "lesser men" meshed easily with images of the enemy as primitive, childish, moronic, or emotionally disturbed. This graphic, originally published in the Detroit News on the occasion of Japan's surrender in August 1945, reached a much larger audience when it was reprinted in the Sunday New York Times.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066

WHEREAS the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national defense material, national defense premises, and national defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U.S.C., Title 50, Sec. 104):

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders who he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgement of the Secretary of War of the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.

I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriated Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.

I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalizations, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.

This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder.

THE WHITE HOUSE
February 19, 1942
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9102

Dated March 18, 1942

7 F.R. 2165

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to provide for the removal from designated areas of persons whose removal is necessary in the interests of national security, it is ordered as follows:

1. There is established in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the War Relocation Authority, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by and responsible to the President.

2. The Director of the War Relocation Authority is authorized and directed to formulate and effectuate a program for the removal, from areas designated from time to time by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander under the authority of Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, of the persons or classes of persons designated under such Executive Order, and for their relocation, maintenance, and supervision.

3. In effectuating such program the Director shall have authority to:

(a) Accomplish all necessary evacuation not undertaken by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander, provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places, provide for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, and supervise their activities.

(b) Provide, insofar as feasible and desirable, for the employment of such persons at useful work in industry, commerce, agriculture, or public projects, prescribe the terms and conditions of such public employment, and safeguard the public interest in the private employment of such persons.

(c) Secure the cooperation, assistance, or services of any governmental agency.

(d) Prescribe regulations necessary or desirable to promote effective execution of such program, and, as a means of coordinating evacuation and relocation activities, consult with the Secretary of War with respect to regulations issued and measures taken by him.

(e) Make such delegations of authority as he may deem necessary.

(f) Employ necessary personnel, and make such expenditures, including the making of loans and grants, and the purchase of real property as may be necessary, within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the Authority.

4. The Director shall consult with the United States Employment Service and other agencies on employment and other problems incident to activities under this order.

5. The Director shall cooperate with the Alien Property Custodian appointed pursuant to Executive Order No. 9095 of March 11, 1942, in formulating policies to govern the custody, management and disposal by the Alien Property Custodian of property belonging to foreign nationals removed under
this order or under Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942; and may assist all other persons
removed under either of such Executive Orders in the management and disposal of their property.

6. Departments and agencies of the United States are directed to cooperate with and assist the
Director in his activities hereunder. The Departments of War and Justice, under the direction of the
Secretary of War and the Attorney General, respectively, shall insofar as consistent with the national
interest provide such protective, police and investigational services as the Director shall find
necessary in connection with activities under the order.

7. There is established within the War Relocation Authority the War Relocation Work Corps. The
Director shall provide, by general regulations, for the enlistment in such Corps, for the duration of the
present war, of persons removed under this order or under Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19,
1942, and shall prescribe the terms and conditions of the work to be performed by such Corps, and
the compensation to be paid.

8. There is established within the War Relocation Authority a Liaison Committee on War Relocation
which shall consist of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Treasury, the Attorney General, the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Labor, the Federal Security Administrator, the Director of
Civilian Defense, and the Alien Property Custodian, or their deputies, and such other persons or
agencies as the Director may designate. The Liaison Committee shall meet at the call of the Director
and shall assist him in his duties.

9. The Director shall keep the President informed with regard to the progress made in carrying out
this order, and perform such related duties as the President may from time to time assign to him.

10. In order to avoid duplication of evacuation activities under this order and Executive Order No.
9066 of February 19, 1942, the Director shall not undertake any evacuation activities within military
areas designated under said Executive Order No. 9066, without the prior approval of the Secretary of
War or the appropriate military commander.

11. This order does not limit the authority granted in Executive Order No. 8972 of December 12,
1941; Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942; Executive Order No. 9095 of March 11, 1972;
Executive Order No. 2526 of December 8, 1941; Executive Proclamation No. 2533 of December 29,
1941; or Executive Proclamation No. 2537 of January 14, 1942; nor does it limit the functions of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
Presidio of San Francisco, California
May 3, 1942

INSTRUCTIONS
TO ALL PERSONS OF
JAPANESE ANCESTRY

Living in the Following Area:
All of that portion of the City of Los Angeles, State of California, within that boundary beginning at
the point at which North Figueroa Street meets a line following the middle of the Los Angeles River;
there southwesterly to the same line; thence southerly on First Street to Alameda Street; thence westerly on
East Third Street to Main Street; thence southerly on Main Street to First Street; thence southerly on
First Street to Figueroa Street; thence northerly on Figueroa Street in the point of beginning.

Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 13, this Headquarters, dated May 3, 1942, all
persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o'clock noon,
P. W. T., Saturday, May 9, 1942.
No Japanese person living in the above area will be permitted to change residence after 12 o'clock noon, P. W. T.,
Sunday, May 3, 1942, without obtaining special permission from the representative of the Commanding
General, Southern California Sector, at the Civil Control Station located at:
Japanese Linoc Church,
120 North San Pedro Street,
Los Angeles, California.

Such permits will only be granted for the purpose of taking members of a family, or in cases of grave emergency.
The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the fol-
lowing ways:
1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.
2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage or other disposition of most kinds
   of property, such as real estate, business and professional equipment, household goods, autos, and
   livestock.
3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.
4. Transports persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence.

The Following Instructions Must Be Observed:
1. A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of the family, or the person in whose name most of
   the property is held, and each individual living alone, will report to the Civil Control Station to receive further
   instructions. This must be done between 9:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Monday, May 4, 1942, or between
   9:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Tuesday, May 5, 1942.
2. Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Assembly Center, the following property:
   (a) Bedding and linens (so matters) for each member of the family;
   (b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;
   (c) Extra clothing for each member of the family;
   (d) Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each member of the family;
   (e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family.

3. All items carried will be securely packaged, tied, and plainly marked with the name of the owner and numbered
   in accordance with instructions obtained at the Civil Control Station. The size and number of packages is limited
   to that which can be carried by the individual or family group.
4. No pets of any kind will be permitted.
5. No personal items and no household goods will be shipped to the Assembly Center.
6. The United States Government through its agents will provide for the storage, at the sole risk of the owner,
   of the more substantial household items, such as fixtures, washing machines, pianos and other heavy furniture.
   Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted for storage if sealed, packed and plainly marked with the
   name and address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a given family.
7. Each family, and individual living alone, will be furnished transportation to the Assembly Center or will be
   authorized to travel by private automobile in a supervised group. All instructions pertaining to the movement
   will be obtained at the Civil Control Station.

Go to the Civil Control Station between the hours of 9:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M.,
Monday, May 4, 1942, or between the hours of 9:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M.,
Tuesday, May 5, 1942, to receive further instructions.

J. L. DeWitt
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding
After reading, outlining and taking notes on the text of Executive Orders 9066 and 9102, please reflect on the following questions. Note that this form is two-sided.

How does FDR rationalize Executive Order 9066 in its first paragraph?

Examine the following passage from paragraph two of Executive Order 9066:

"... I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders who he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion."

What power does FDR grant the Secretary of War and military commanders in the above passage?

The language of the document is noticeably vague. Why do you think that is?

How does FDR rationalize Executive Order 9102 in its first paragraph?
The second directive of Executive Order 9102 authorizes the newly-established War Relocation Authority to “formulate and effectuate a program for the removal, from the areas designated from time to time by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander under the authority of Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, of the persons or classes of persons designated under such an Executive Order, and for the relocation, maintenance, and supervision.” Do you believe the military should be given the power to relocate people of specific ethnicity for the purposes of national security? Explain your answer.
The Decision to Drop the Bomb: Heroic, Tragic and Apocalyptic Narratives

This lesson plan is designed to address, in part or in full, the following California History-Social Science Content Standard(s):

11.7

6. Describe major developments in aviation, weaponry, communication, and medicine and the war’s impact on the location of American industry and resources.

7. Discuss the decision to drop atomic bombs and the consequences of the decision (Hiroshima and Nagasaki).

11.9

3. Trace the origins and geopolitical consequences (foreign and (domestic) of the Cold War and containment policy.

Class Time: 90 minutes (2 traditional class periods)

Objectives:

Students will be able to engage in vigorous historical debate about the most important news event of the twentieth century: the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Students will be able to identify and describe the three dominant perspectives that characterize the debate over dropping the bomb: Heroic, Tragic and Apocalyptic.

Students will be able to analyze the reasons why certain scientists, military and political personnel expressed doubts about or opposition to the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Students will be able to design a museum exhibit on the bombings that reflects Heroic, Tragic and Apocalyptic perspectives.

Background and Materials:

This plan assumes that students have both viewed episode 3 of Oliver Stone’s Untold History of the United States and conducted background reading on the Manhattan Project.
Students will have read Supplement 3-D, “The Atomic Bomb: Hiroshima and Nagasaki” for homework the night prior and completed Supplement 3-E pertaining to that reading.


Supplement 3-F: “A Petition to the President of the United States,” July 17, 1945, signed by Leo Szilard and 69 other scientists at Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory.

Supplement 3-G: Quotes From Prominent Military, Political and Scientific Personnel Concerning the Atomic Bomb

Potential Interdisciplinary Connection:
This lesson is taught in History class while John Hersey’s “Hiroshima” is taught in English class.

Focusing Questions:

Why is there such vigorous historical debate over the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Why did some scientists, military and political personnel oppose either the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki or the eventual development of hydrogen bombs?

How are Hiroshima and Nagasaki remembered today?

The Action:

Day 1

To activate prior knowledge, teacher asks, “Why did the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum decide to cancel its 1995 exhibit on the Enola Gay?” Teacher gives students approximately 5-7 minutes to respond.

Teacher then explains that since 1945, there has been significant debate about whether or not the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were necessary to end World War II and significant discussion about the legacy of those events. Teacher explains to students that since 1945, three narratives have developed concerning the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (adapted
from Peter J. Kuznick, “The Decision to Risk the Future: Harry Truman, the Atomic Bomb and the Apocalyptic Narrative,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://www.japanfocus.org/-peter_j_kuznick/2479. Teacher projects the following material describing the three narratives onto the screen:

**Heroic Narrative:**
The “heroic” narrative, shaped by wartime science administrator James Conant and Stimson, and reaffirmed by all postwar American presidents up to and including Bill Clinton, with only Eisenhower demurring, justifies the bombing as an ultimately humane, even merciful, way of bringing the “good war” to a rapid conclusion and avoiding an American invasion against a barbaric and fanatically resistant foe.

For further explanation of this perspective, see Paul Fussell’s essay titled “Thank God for the Atom Bomb” in The New Republic, August 1981

**Tragic Narrative:**
Seen from the perspective of the bombs’ victims, the tragic narrative condemns the wanton killing of hundreds of thousands of civilians and the inordinate suffering of the survivors. Although Hiroshima had some military significance as a naval base and home of the Second General Army Headquarters, as Truman insisted, American strategic planners targeted the civilian part of the city, maximizing the bomb’s destructive power and civilian deaths. It produced limited military casualties.

**Apocalyptic Narrative:**
A framework for understanding U.S. actions that has even greater relevance to today’s citizens who must continue to grapple with the long-term ramifications of nuclear war, particularly the threat of extinction of human life. While this third narrative has important elements in common with the tragic narrative, maintaining, as did much of America’s top military command, that surrender could have been induced without the use of atomic bombs, it does not see the Japanese as the only victims and holds Truman, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, and General Leslie Groves, among others, to a much higher level of accountability for knowingly putting at risk all human and animal existence... By unleashing nuclear weapons on the world as the U.S. did in 1945, in a manner that Soviet leaders, as expected, immediately recognized as ominous and threatening, Truman and his collaborators were gambling with the future of life on the planet.

The explanation of the Heroic, Tragic and Apocalyptic Narratives should take about ten minutes. For further context, see Peter Kuznick’s article “The Decision to Risk the Future” here:

http://www.japanfocus.org/-peter_j_kuznick/2479

The following set of questions and answers should take about ten minutes:
Teacher asks, "When you think of the atomic bomb, what image first pops into your mind?"

**Target Answer:** the mushroom cloud
Teacher then projects an image of the mushroom cloud on the screen.

Teacher asks, “What characteristics of the atomic bomb are absent from that image?”

**Target Answer:** human consequences, the mushroom cloud implies victory from the air without taking into account the human tragedy unfolding underneath

Teacher explains that since 1945, the mushroom cloud has been the image that most Americans associate with the atomic bomb.

Teacher then asks, “In contrast, does anyone know what image most Japanese associate with the atomic bomb?”

**Target Answer:** a blinding flash, or “pika-don” in Japanese

Teacher shows the image entitled “Fire,” painted by Ira and Toshi Maruki, who observed Hiroshima three days after the bombing. This image embodies the tragic narrative; the civilian perspective:

![Image of Fire](http://www.aya.or.jp/~marukimsn/gen/gen2e.html)

Teacher explains that the mushroom cloud has become the image most closely associated with the Heroic Narrative, and that the blinding flash and subsequent fire have become the images most closely associated with the Tragic Narrative.

Teacher asks students what image comes to mind when they think of the Apocalyptic Narrative. **Teacher then gives students ten minutes to draw that image in their notebooks.**
After the ten minutes of silent drawing are up, teacher asks if anyone would like to share their images with the class. A few students share their images. Teacher asks other students to reflect on them and discussion ensues until the end of class.
Day 2

Teacher asks if any other students were interested in sharing their images representing the apocalyptic narrative. (5-7 minutes)

Teacher reiterates the message articulated in Supplement 3-D: “The Atomic Bomb: Hiroshima and Nagasaki” that “there [was a good deal of debate over the use of [atomic] weapons during the summer of 1945, much of which focused on more complex issues than the lives that would be saved or lost in ending the war.”

Teacher explains that the debate had commenced before the atomic bombs were even successfully tested, and that much of the early criticism ironically came from the same scientists who were developing the bomb.

Teacher hands out Supplement 3-F, “A Petition to the President of the United States” and asks students to read it silently and highlight passages that are of interest. (8 minutes)

Teacher unpacks the document and stimulates discussion by asking the following questions in order. Teacher records student responses on white board. The following section should take approximately 20 minutes:

Teacher briefly explains that the Manhattan Project was a secret project, initiated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1942, to produce the first nuclear weapon. The project was developed at the urging of Albert Einstein and other scientists who feared that the Nazis were developing their own weapon. Thus, the atomic bomb was originally conceived to be used against Nazi Germany should the need arise.

Teacher asks, “from paragraph two of the scientists’ petition, what finally compelled Manhattan Project scientists to circulate and submit this petition to the President?”

Target Answer: These seventy scientists believed that they were developing the bomb as a defensive weapon to be used against the Nazis. Since the defeat of Germany, scientists were becoming increasingly alarmed that the bomb project might be used as an offensive weapon against Japan, which troubled them. Teacher then might ask as a tangent question:

“What do you think might have happened if Germany developed an atomic bomb before the United States?”

Teacher asks, “what fears do the scientists articulate in paragraphs five and six?”
Target Answers: That using atomic bombs in war might “open... the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.”

That cities would be in “continuous danger of sudden annihilation.”

Teacher explains, “in paragraph seven, the scientists express the following sentiment: “The added material strength which this lead gives to the United States brings with it the obligation of restraint and if we were to violate this obligation our moral position would be weakened in the eyes of the world and in our own eyes.” Teacher asks, “why do you think they were concerned that the American moral position would be weakened?”

Target Answer: Because if the United States used the weapon, particularly against civilians, it would not be in the position to admonish other nations not to develop or use their own.

Teacher asks, “if President Truman had been more sensitive to the concerns of these seventy scientists, he may have decided not to drop atomic bombs on civilian populations even after they had been developed. What message might that action have sent to the rest of the world?”

Target Answer: It might have sent the message that the United States, though capable, would not resort to wholesale atomic destruction of cities in war.

Teacher asks, “pretend you are the president of a country with strained relations with the United States. How might you react to the knowledge that the U.S. has the capability to destroy an entire city with one atomic bomb?”

Allow for a variety of answers here, which should stimulate further discussion.

Teacher shares quotes from others who objected to the usage of atomic bombs on moral, military or other grounds. Teacher explains the importance of sharing reservations, misgivings or opposition with those in charge. Teacher facilitates discussion about those quotes for the remainder of the period, and focuses on whichever he/she finds most provocative. The quotes can be found on Supplement 3-F.
**Culminating Task:**

*Teacher divides class into groups of three.*

Pretend that your group is curating a new Smithsonian exhibit on the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The museum director, your boss, has asked you to come up with a balanced exhibit that reflects all three narratives on the atomic bombings, Heroic, Tragic and Apocalyptic.

Think about museum exhibits that you have attended. Think about the following: What draws your attention in? What bores you? What interrupts you?

Now, pretend that your visitors have never heard about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. How will you effectively teach them? How will you bring to life all three major perspectives in a format that is visually appealing and intellectually provocative?

Produce a blueprint of an exhibit that will orient visitors to the following issues we have discussed over the past few days:
- American wartime propaganda
- Japanese and Japanese-American internment
- Manhattan Project scientists’ perspectives
- Perspectives of other military and civilian leaders
- Heroic, Tragic and Apocalyptic perspectives

Your exhibit must employ dynamic imagery and must be laid out in a way that makes sense to visitors.

*Once blueprints are complete, groups can share them with the class. If more time is available, students can convert the classroom or other area of the school into a museum that commemorates the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.*
The Atomic Bomb: Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Adapted from National History Education Clearinghouse
www.teachinghistory.org
Christopher Hamner

The Bombings
On August 6, 1945, after 44 months of increasingly brutal fighting in the Pacific, an American B-29 bomber loaded with a devastating new weapon appeared in the sky over Hiroshima, Japan. Minutes later, that new weapon—a bomb that released its enormous destructive energy by splitting uranium atoms to create a chain reaction—detonated in the sky, killing some 70,000 Japanese civilians instantly and leveling the city. Three days later, the U.S. dropped a second atomic bomb over the city of Nagasaki, with similarly devastating results. The following week, Japan’s emperor addressed his country over the radio to announce the decision to surrender. World War II had finally come to its dramatic conclusion.

The decision to employ atomic weapons against Japan remains a controversial chapter in American history. Even before the new President Harry S. Truman finalized his decision to use the bombs, members of the President’s inner circle grappled with the specifics of the decision to drop the new weapon. Their concerns revolved around a cluster of related issues: whether the use of the technology was necessary to defeat an already crippled Japan; whether a similar outcome could be effected without using the bomb against civilian targets; whether the detonation of a second bomb days after the first, before Japan had time to formulate its response, was justified; and what effect the demonstration of the bomb’s devastating power would have on postwar diplomacy, particularly on America’s uneasy wartime alliance with the Soviet Union.

Controversy is Alive and Well
The ongoing struggle to present the history of the atomic bombings in a balanced and accurate manner is an interesting story in its own right, and one that has occasionally generated an enormous amount of controversy. In 1995, anticipating the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum planned a display around
the fuselage of the *Enola Gay*, the aircraft that dropped the first bomb, for its museum on the National Mall. That exhibit would place the invention of atomic weapons and the decision to use them against civilian targets in the context of World War II and the Cold War, provoking broader questions about the morality of strategic bombing and nuclear arms in general.

*The ongoing struggle to present the history of the atomic bombings in a balanced and accurate manner is an interesting story in its own right.* . . .

The design for the exhibit quickly triggered an avalanche of controversy. Critics charged that it offered a too-sympathetic portrayal of the Japanese enemy, and that its focus on the children and elderly victims of the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki encouraged visitors to question the necessity and morality of the weapons. As originally written, those critics alleged, the exhibit forwarded an anti-American interpretation of events surrounding the bombs' use. That such a message was to appear in a national museum amplified the frustrations of critics (especially veterans' groups), who believed that the exhibit should not lead museumgoers to question the decision to drop the bomb or to portray the Pacific war in morally neutral terms.

In place of the original exhibit, veterans’ organizations offered a replacement exhibit with a very different message. Their proposed exhibit portrayed the development of the atomic weapons as a triumph of American technical ingenuity, and the use of both bombs as an act that saved lives—the lives of American soldiers who would otherwise have had to invade the Japanese home islands, and the lives of thousands of Japanese who would, it was assumed, have fought and died with fanatic determination opposing such an invasion. The revised exhibit removed the questioning tone of the original, replacing it with more certainty: the use of the bombs, it argued, was both necessary and justified.

*When the controversy died down, the Smithsonian elected not to stage any exhibit of the aircraft fuselage.*

The historians who produced the original exhibit stood accused of historical revisionism by their critics, of needlessly complicating patriotic consensus with moral concerns. The fallout from the controversy led to
loud, public debate in the halls of Congress and, ultimately, to the resignation of several leaders at the museum. When the controversy died down, the Smithsonian elected not to stage any exhibit of the aircraft fuselage. Years later, the plane went on display at the Smithsonian’s Udvar-Hazy Center outside Washington, DC, where it resides now, accompanied by a brief placard detailing its technical specifications.

The Textbook Approach
Because the use of the atomic weapons evokes such passionate responses from Americans—from those who believe that the use of the bombs was wholly justified to those who believe that their use was criminal, and the many people who fall somewhere in between—it is a particularly difficult topic for textbooks to discuss. In order to avoid a potentially treacherous debate, textbooks have often adopted a set of compromises that describe the end of the war but avoid or omit some of the most difficult parts of the conversation.

A 1947 history textbook, produced just two years after the bombings did just this, sidestepping the controversy by presenting the story at a distance and refraining from interpretation or discussion of civilian casualties: “The United States unveiled its newest weapon, demonstrating twice—first at Hiroshima and then at Nagasaki—that a good-sized city could almost be erased from the map in one blinding flash. Confronted by this combination of forces, Japan surrendered August 14.”

“If the war dragged on and Americans had to invade Japan, it might cost a million lives…life for life, the odds were that [the atomic bomb] would cost less.”

Later textbooks made other compromises. The 2005 textbook A History of the United States adopts a familiar tone, arguing that President Truman based his decision to drop the bomb mainly on a complex calculus of the cost in human lives if the war were to continue: “Should the United States use the atomic bomb? No one knew how long Japan would hold out.” That uncertainty forced American planners to assume the worst: “If the war dragged on and Americans had to invade Japan, it might cost a million lives. The atomic bomb, President Truman knew, might kill many thousands of innocent Japanese. But life for life, the odds were that it would cost less.”

A 2006 textbook, The Americans, suggests that the decision to drop the bomb occurred largely outside moral concerns: “Should the Allies use the
bomb to bring an end to the war? Truman did not hesitate. On July 25, 1945, he ordered the military to make final plans for dropping two atomic bombs on Japan.” The paragraph on the decision concludes with a compelling quote from the President himself: “Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt it should be used.”

Other recent textbooks have labored to present this often-contentious topic in a more nuanced manner. The 2007 textbook American Anthem describes the decision-making process as an involved one, observing “Truman formed a group to advise him about using the bomb. This group debated where the bomb should be used and whether the Japanese should be warned. After carefully considering all the options, Truman decided to drop the bomb on a Japanese city. There would be no warning.” The carefully written passage does not suggest that the question of whether to use the bomb against civilian targets was part of the debate; it describes the inquiry as focused on where to drop the bomb and whether a warning would precede its use.

More recent textbooks often offer viewpoints from other perspectives—including Japanese civilians, who suffered the legacy of atomic fallout for decades after the original explosion—from a morally neutral stance, inviting (or directly asking) readers to make their own judgments. Besides offering a description of Truman’s decision-making process, the American Anthem textbook includes a passage of equivalent length that describes the destruction on the ground, anchored by a quote from a survivor of the Hiroshima bomb. It also features a “Counterpoints” section that contrasts a quote from Secretary of War Henry Stimson supporting the bomb’s use with one from Leo Szilard, an atomic physicist, characterizing the use of the bombs against Japan as “one of the greatest blunders of history.”

What the Documents Reveal
A discussion that focuses primarily on the need to employ the bomb in order to save lives—the lives of Japanese civilians as well as those of American soldiers—is incomplete. In fact, as the documentary record shows, there was a good deal of debate over the use of the weapons during the summer of 1945, much of which focused on more complex issues than the lives that would be saved or lost in ending the war.

A discussion that focuses primarily on the need to employ the bomb in order to save lives—the lives of Japanese civilians as well as those of American
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe and one of the architects of the successful campaign against Germany, was one of the dissenters. After the war, Eisenhower recalled his position in 1945, asserting that “Japan was defeated and... dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary.” Eisenhower’s objection was, in part, a moral one; as he noted, “I thought our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face.'” Eisenhower recalled that his objection found an unreceptive audience with Secretary of War Henry Stimson. In Eisenhower’s own words, Stimson was “deeply perturbed by my attitude, almost angrily refuting the reasons I gave for my quick conclusions.” (In a separate document, Stimson himself concurred with Eisenhower’s conclusion that there was little active American attempt to respond to Japan’s peace feelers to prevent the use of the atomic weapons: “No effort was made, and none was seriously considered, to achieve surrender merely in order not to have to use the bomb.”)

The year after the Japanese surrender, the U.S. government released its own Strategic Bombing Survey, an effort to assess the effectiveness of dropping bombs on civilian populations, including the firebombs used in Europe and the Pacific, and the atomic weapons detonated over Hiroshima and Tokyo (see Primary Source U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey [1946]). Its findings suggested that the bombs were largely superfluous, and that Japan’s surrender was all but guaranteed even without the threat of invasion. “Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts,” the SBS concluded, “and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that . . . Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.” Though firm in its assertions, the SBS received widespread criticism from many quarters for drawing conclusions far beyond the available evidence. (Many critics noted, rightly, that the SBS was itself hardly a disinterested document, since it was produced by an organization with an interest in emphasizing the effectiveness of conventional airpower.)

*The compromises 21st-century textbooks have struck*
The Strategic Bombing Survey's conclusions highlight another important factor in the decision to employ the bombs against Japan: the message such a display would send to Josef Stalin. Uneasy allies in the war against Germany, Russian forces joined the war in Japan in August 1945.

Contemporary observers noted that the demonstration of the deadly new weapon's considerable might had the additional effect of warning Stalin that the U.S. would exercise considerable power in the postwar period. Furthermore, dropping two bombs only days apart had the added benefit of convincing the Russians that the U.S. possessed a formidable supply of the new weapons; when in fact, the U.S. nuclear arsenal was entirely depleted after the two attacks on Japan.

A survey of primary sources from the summer of 1945 and the months afterward reveals a variety of opinions, arguments, and justifications regarding the use of atomic weapons. Embracing the variety of opinions while also presenting a narrative that depicts the decision and its effects from multiple perspectives is a near-impossible task. Given how controversial the story of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has proved to be, the compromises 21st-century textbooks have struck appear understandable if not necessary.
How many civilians were killed in Hiroshima by the atomic bomb? __________

Why was the original 1995 Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum exhibit criticized? What types of broader questions was the exhibit originally designed to provoke?

What type of exhibit did veterans’ organizations propose in its place?

How are recent textbooks portraying the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

What did the 1946 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey conclude about the necessity of the atomic bombings?
SECRET

July 17, 1945

A PETITION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Discoveries of which the people of the United States are not aware may affect
the welfare of this nation in the near future. The liberation of atomic power which has
been achieved places atomic bombs in the hands of the Army. It places in your hands, as
Commander-in-Chief, the fateful decision whether or not to sanction the use of such bombs
in the present phase of the war against Japan.

We, the undersigned scientists, have been working in the field of atomic power.
Until recently we have had to fear that the United States might be attacked by atomic bombs
during this war and that her only defense might lie in a counterattack by the same means.
Today, with the defeat of Germany, this danger is averted and we feel impelled to say what
follows:

The war has to be brought speedily to a successful conclusion and attacks by
atomic bombs may very well be an effective method of warfare. We feel, however, that such
attacks on Japan could not be justified, at least not unless the terms which will be im-
posed after the war on Japan were made public in detail and Japan were given an opportunity
to surrender.

If such public announcement gave assurance to the Japanese that they could look
forward to a life devoted to peaceful pursuits in their homeland and if Japan still re-
fused to surrender our nation might then, in certain circumstances, find itself forced to
resort to the use of atomic bombs. Such a step, however, ought not to be made at any time
without seriously considering the moral responsibilities which are involved.

The development of atomic power will provide the nations with new means of
destruction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this
direction, and there is almost no limit to the destructive power which will become avail-
able in the course of their future development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent
of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to
bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable
scale.

If after this war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits
rival powers to be in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities
of the United States as well as the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of
sudden annihilation. All the resources of the United States, moral and material, may have
to be mobilized to prevent the advent of such a world situation. Its prevention is at
present the solemn responsibility of the United States—singled out by virtue of her lead
in the field of atomic power.

The added material strength which this lead gives to the United States brings
with it the obligation of restraint and if we were to violate this obligation our moral
position would be weakened in the eyes of the world and in our own eyes. It would then
be more difficult for us to live up to our responsibility of bringing the unleashed forces
of destruction under control.

In view of the foregoing, we, the undersigned, respectfully petition: first,
that you exercise your power as Commander-in-Chief, to rule that the United States shall
not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this war unless the terms which will be imposed
upon Japan have been made public in detail and Japan knowing these terms has refused to
surrender; second, that in such an event the question whether or not to use atomic bombs
be decided by you in the light of the considerations presented in this petition as well as
all the other moral responsibilities which are involved.

[Signatures]
Jacob Bronowski, in recounting a conversation he overheard between Manhattan Project physicist Leo Szilard and another person not long after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima:

“I had not been long back from Hiroshima when I heard someone say, in Szilard’s presence, that it was a tragedy of scientists that their discoveries were used for destruction. Szilard replied, as he more than anyone else had the right to reply, that it was not the tragedy of scientists: ‘it is the tragedy of mankind.’”

Admiral William D. Leahy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

“It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons... My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children. We were the first to have this weapon in our possession, and the first to use it. There is a practical certainty that potential enemies will have it in the future and that atomic bombs will sometime be used against us.”

Diary of President Harry Truman, July 25, 1945:

“We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.

The weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital or the new.

He (Stimson) and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives.”
Joseph Rotblat, Manhattan Project scientist:

“I have to bring to your notice a terrifying reality: with the development of nuclear weapons Man has acquired, for the first time in history, the technical means to destroy the whole of civilization in a single act.”

Dwight D. Eisenhower:

“[in July 1945], I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to [Secretary of War Henry Stimson] my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face.’ The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude.”